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The U.S. Politico–Military–Industrial Complex (2024)

FAQs

What is the US military-industrial complex? ›

military-industrial complex, network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. The military-industrial complex in a country typically attempts to marshal political support for continued or increased military spending by the national government.

What is the military-industrial complex and how does it influence US foreign policy? ›

The expression military–industrial complex (MIC) describes the relationship between a country's military and the defense industry that supplies it, seen together as a vested interest which influences public policy.

What does the idea of the military-industrial complex emphasize? ›

Military–Industrial Complex, Organization and History

The maintenance of armed forces, emphasis on weapons development and production, and threatening armed aggression. The network of military agencies and production firms (including private and public concerns) involved in the development and production of armaments.

Which of the following is a critique of the military-industrial complex? ›

Final answer: Critics point out concerns about high military spending, arms proliferation, and the impact on democracy due to the military-industrial complex.

What are the consequences of military industrial complexes? ›

Many scholars have justifiably criticized the Military-Industrial Complex because it can lead to political corruption and unnecessary defense spending by the government. However, the defense work of General Electric from World War II to 1970 was beneficial to America in many respects.

Which president talked about the military-industrial complex? ›

On January 17, 1961, in this farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower warned against the establishment of a "military-industrial complex."

What is an example of an industrial complex? ›

Examples. Military–Industrial Complex — Businesses that supply the army with uniforms, artillery, etc, profit from the continuation of war and will be hurt by peace.

Which statement best describes an effect of the military-industrial complex on American society? ›

Explanation: The military-industrial complex has had a significant impact on American society. The statement that best describes this effect is that the military-industrial complex led to an increase in technological advancements and innovation.

What is the historical significance of military-industrial complex? ›

First named by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell address, the Military-Industrial Complex, originally an exclusively American phenomenon of the Cold War, was tailored to develop and produce military technologies equal to the existential threat perceived to be posed by the Soviet Union.

Does the military-industrial complex create jobs? ›

Key Findings. $1 billion in military spending creates approximately 11,200 jobs, compared with 26,700 in education, 16,800 in clean energy and 17,200 in health care.

What is the military industrial system? ›

: an informal alliance of the military and related government departments with defense industries that is held to influence government policy.

Who warned US about the military-industrial complex? ›

On January 17, 1961, in this farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower warned against the establishment of a "military-industrial complex."

What is the US Defense Industrial Base? ›

The Defense Industrial Base Sector is the worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts, to meet U.S. military requirements.

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